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and each will vary according to the different discrepancies of its internal and external parts. For it will differ in one, two, or even a greater number of parts, as happens in monsters of a rare and unusual type, which will be discussed under the heading of omens. Or, there may be more or fewer parts that conform to those of the parents, or parts that are deformed, or placed outside their proper location, or curved in shape so that the fetus is forced to walk like a quadruped. In terms of sex, the fetus may resemble both parents, as in a hermaphrodite, or it may differ entirely from the parents—as when an animal of a different species is born, which happens when a woman gives birth to a dog or a snake. Finally, the offspring may resemble the parents at birth, but if over time it fails to reach the proper human stature, it becomes a Dwarf, and if it exceeds the usual height, it becomes a Giant. Furthermore, these species of monsters are rarely found in simple forms; they are usually complicated, as will be observed in the appropriate section.

DEFINITION

In examining the internal nature and definition of a monster, Aristotle must be consulted in several places. Indeed, in his *History of the Generation of Animals*, he establishes that a monster is a defect in a thing, contrary to its nature, occurring in those things that do not always, but for the most part, act in the same way.

The same Aristotle, in his *Physics*, has these words: "Errors also occur in those things produced by the arts; for a grammarian has written incorrectly, and a doctor has administered a potion incorrectly. Therefore, it is clear that errors can also occur in those things produced by nature. If there are things in art where what is done correctly is done for the sake of something, then in those cases where errors occur, the art attempts to do it for the sake of something but fails to achieve it; likewise, it will be so in natural things, and monsters will be the errors of that which was for the sake of something." Thus, in the first compositions, those creatures that consisted partly of human parts and partly of bovine parts—if they could not reach a certain limit or end—were surely made because some principle, just as with the seed today, was weakened or corrupted.

From this, he concluded that a monster is a defect of nature failing to reach its destined goal because of some impediment, just as tends to happen in artificial things—namely, when a craftsman is unable to achieve the end already conceived in his mind. Since, therefore, according to the Philosopher’s mind, nature degenerates in some way from its own kind when procreating monsters, it should not be asserted that the large-eared men living in the northern Ocean, and others of this sort mentioned in the first chapter, should be placed among the monsters, since they do not depart from their own kind at birth.

Therefore, since a definition (according to Aristotle) is integrated from the nearest genus of the thing to be defined and its essential differences, and since monsters establish their nature through an admirable deformity, the distinguished Fortunio Liceto, in his work on monsters, asserted with good reason that a monster is a sub-celestial living being that, through an enormous constitution of its members, strikes those who look upon it with horror and wonder; it is born very rarely and is generated as a secondary purpose of nature because of an impediment in the principles of its formation.

Indeed, when nature is unable to strive toward a most perfect work, it produces an imperfect one; therefore, it must be established that monsters emerge from a secondary purpose of nature due to some impediment. However, this kind of monster encompasses not only the human species, but also those of beasts and plants. Furthermore, this definition includes only "proper" monsters, since certain things considered monstrous by the common people are excluded. Likewise, beasts born from a woman are not called true monsters, since they bring no wonder to those who look upon them except in comparison to their parents, even though their origin was monstrous.

For our part, following the division of monsters provided above, we can follow the opinion of Marcello Donati, who called everything "contrary to nature" a monster. Thus, we can broaden the definition so that it encompasses much more, asserting that a monster is any sublunary thing not fashioned according to the accustomed norm of nature,