nature’s errors, born outside her intention, just as Aristotle testifies in his *Physics*.

On the other hand, those who defend the opposite opinion challenge the aforementioned arguments. Regarding the first point, they deny that a natural agent necessarily intends to procreate something similar to itself. For example, a dog during mating—lacking reason—undoubtedly does not have its offspring in mind; rather, it approaches the union solely for the sake of pleasure. Indeed, if all sense of pleasure were removed, it would shrink away from coitus entirely. Therefore, this agent is responding to a desire for pleasure imparted by universal Nature, so that, in this way, something similar might eventually be produced to preserve the species.

Next, to set aside the second argument, they deny that monsters are generated by accident, as they believe monsters contribute to the decor and beauty of the universe. For this reason, since Nature strives to preserve a world adorned with all manner of things, she must necessarily intend for monsters to exist. To dismantle the third argument, they count monsters among "good" things, since they do not lack a soul, which is inherently good. Monsters are only called "bad" by some in comparison to perfect things; nonetheless, even these—however deformed or imperfect—concur with perfect things to preserve the beauty of the universe.

In this way, the final doubt is also resolved: for while the species of living creatures are preserved, the monsters belonging to those species are preserved as well. And because the authority of Aristotle—who called monsters "nature’s errors"—seemed to contradict this view, they respond that Nature usually operates perfectly in generation, but occasionally acts imperfectly when she produces monsters. Thus, this second operation of Nature, in comparison to the first, is called an "accidental action" or an "error" because she performs it rarely, but not because it was outside of Nature’s intention.

With these points established, they construct other arguments to further confirm this view. The first is this: every agent always acts for some end; therefore, Nature will always operate for a determined end, and thus, in producing monsters, she acts according to her intention. Nor does it matter that Nature only occasionally brings about monstrous births, or that they are outside the usual course of Nature, since things that happen rarely should not be reduced to a defect or a "sin" of Nature. Furthermore, if a monster were truly contrary to Nature's intention, she would certainly not complete the work of the monster once begun; yet we observe exactly the opposite. Nature perfects the monster started in the womb and brings it forth into the light; therefore, one must assert that monsters correspond to the intention of both Nature and the Agent.

They add that no animal is generated by accident or outside of Nature’s intention, and since a monster is an animal, it must be produced by Nature of its own accord. Finally, if Nature regards the primary characteristics belonging to a species, she must surely regard the remaining traits that follow that species. A monstrous man, whether with an oversized head or six fingers on his hand, is referred to the same species as a non-monstrous man; therefore, in the act of generation, Nature regards both the monstrous and the non-monstrous human.

Those who pronounce that monsters are not nature’s errors, but are procreated for the ornament of the universe, rely on these arguments. In doing so, they favor the authority of Saint Augustine, cited earlier, who wrote that the harmony by which all things are beautiful arises not only from the equality of like things but also from the congruent and ordered gradation of unlike things. From this, they later infer and proclaim the necessity of many imperfect things in the universe—without it being an error of Nature—so that they might uphold their own opinion. Finally, as a crowning point, they add that if proximate, remote, and most remote causes—such as God and the celestial bodies—concur in the procreation of monsters, no one can possibly assert that this generation is accidental, since all the aforementioned causes, joined together, never work toward anything outside of their intention.

Consequently, because this opinion fails to grasp the heart of the matter, it must be refuted by the following reasons. First, one should not assert that things which happen rarely and do not belong to permanent species—such as monsters—pertain to the decor of the world, since the beauty of the universe consists only in things that are perfect and permanent. Furthermore, a monster, insofar as it is a monster, indicates nothing but a defect and a privation, according to the opinion of the Philosopher set down in the second book of the *Physics*. Therefore, a monster can provide no perfection, and consequently it will not pertain to the perfection of the universe